Old and new threats to cultural security – Andrzej Szabaciuk

Old and new threats to cultural security
Andrzej Szabaciuk
0000-0003-3413-7454
The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Abstract
The article aims to present old and new security issues from the point of view of the societal
security of the state and specific social groups. Threats articulated in the discourse on security are
often not real threats, they are only an element of the politics of fear, the aim of which is to
artificially build fear of "others", thus strengthening group identity. Existential threats may justify
the use of extraordinary measures, often involving the violation or circumvention of the law. They
can justify actions requiring the restriction of civil rights or broadly understood human rights.
Discourse securitization may lead to an increase in xenophobic or anti-immigrant moods, which
may generate social conflicts in the long term.
Keywords: globalization, migration, ethnic minorities, securitization, language policy
Introduction
The topic of this chapter is potential threats from the perspective of cultural security on an
international scale, from the point of view of the nation-state, and in the local dimension. Precise
identification of threats is an extremely difficult task in the globalization era, with dynamically
and fundamentally changing social and political life. Phenomena interpreted by some groups as a
cultural threat are perceived by others as an opportunity for cultural diversity, increasing
innovation or efficiency in the economic sphere. The politicization and securitization of "national
culture" is an important element of contemporary public discourse. In part, it is related to the
complexity of the definition of culture, which includes elements of historical and intangible
heritage, beliefs, ethnic divisions, historical narrative, and political ideology.
The debate around the role and meaning of culture shapes political and social processes in
contemporary countries. It defines how the attitude to globalization, religion, migration processes,
ethnic minorities may condition the public debate and how this discourse has developed over the
past decades. New technologies and growing social mobility limit the state monopoly in terms of
defining the national culture. The decentralization and "democratization" of culture are changing
the perception of cultural threats. On the other hand, populist, anti-immigration, and antiglobalization groups can use culture to fight for specific political goals.
Historical, political, social, and economic conditions significantly influence the perception of
cultural threats. As a result, the perception of cultural threats in Western Europe and, for example,
in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is often diametrically different. In
CEE globalization is conducive to social polarization and the intensification of the debate on the
issue of cultural threats. Exposing cultural and linguistic differences etc. may serve as a pretext for
fostering separatist tendencies (vide Catalonia, Donbas, Scotland), and in extreme cases
annexations of the territory of a foreign country (such as Crimea). On the other hand, it may be
one of the elements contributing to integration tendencies (vide the European Union, Eurasian
Economic Union, etc.). Artificially exposing cultural differences (vide Ukraine, Baltic states), or
marginalizing them (vide Belarus), maybe an important instrument of the state's foreign policy,
seen as essential for its international security. The politicization and securitization of culture may
be linked to the problem of ensuring fundamental human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities.
It relates to a debate about a specific model of cultural, immigration, ethnic or educational policy.
For this reason, the analysed phenomenon is significant in the context of the changes currently
taking place in the international sphere, from the perspective of nation-states and in the regional
and local contexts.
In the opinion of Barry Buzan, one of the founders of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies,
cultural security is an element of broadly understood societal security, which is an element of the
five pillars of state security along with military, economic, political, and environmental security
(Buzan, 1983: 4–15). Another representative of the Copenhagen School, Ole Waever, proposed a
new approach in the analysis of security: the duality of state and societal security. The first focuses
on the problem of state sovereignty, the second on the identity of individual social groups. In
Waever’s analysis, the rivalry between ethnic and religious groups is of key importance from the
point of view of societal security. However, the importance of other groups (ideological, political,
sexual, ecological, etc.) cannot be ignored. At the heart of these two key groups is national and
religious identity (Wæver et al., 1993: 23–27). The problem of religious and ethnic minorities and
the challenges arising from migration processes are the key issues analysed in this chapter.
Cultural theories and security studies
Culture, and in a particular religion, which is an important component of it, caught the attention of
researchers of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century, who often treated
it as one of the key factors conditioning and explaining the activities of political entities. These
studies date back to the Second World War, when the United States, fascist Germany, and the
Soviet Union developed in-depth studies of the culture of hostile countries. After World War II,
we observed the development of regional studies in the United States, which introduced the
specificity of individual regions and countries, noting the importance of language, broadly
understood culture and specific historical experience as elements conditioning development, but
also the specificity of the decision-making process. However, the disintegration of the bipolar
system and the criticism of the realist paradigm brought immense popularity of cultural theories
(Desch, 1998: 144–156).
Among the researchers who emphasized the importance of culture as an independent variable,
helpful in explaining international relations, we can mention Michael Barnett, Thomas RisseKappen, Samuel P. Huntington, Jeffrey Legro, Elizabeth Kier (Shaffer, 2006: 6–8). The
civilization paradigm of Samuel Huntington gained enormous popularity and sparked lively
academic discussion, which was accompanied by great media and political resonance. His famous
article, and then a monograph, put forward the controversial thesis that civilization divisions will
run along the line of cultural divisions, and so subsequent conflicts will take place between great
civilizations that are "cultural entities", and the core of most civilizations is religion (Huntington,
1996: 45–101). His paradigm met with harsh criticism from the scientific community, but many
researchers emphasized that his scientific contribution was to show the weaknesses of realistic and
liberal theories that ignore the importance of culture as a factor conditioning cooperation and
competition between specific states and non-state actors.
The socio-political processes observed in the international sphere after the Second World War
strengthened the role of culture in research on the internal and foreign policy of the state. However,
its importance largely depended on the perspective of specific research approaches. As Marcus
Fischer emphasizes, from the point of view of the theory of international relations, the place of
culture largely depends on the approaches of individual paradigms to Enlightenment rationalism.
For this reason, liberalism rejects culture as a variable that does not go hand in hand with progress,
realism accepts it as an important source of foreign policy, Marxism assigns it a legitimizing role
in the "superstructure", and constructivism assigns culture the role of an element that constructs
foreign policy. According to Fischer, three key factors shape foreign policy: culture, ideology, and
material interests. Ideology and culture are more normative and contingent than the interests of
security, prosperity, and the will to dominate (Fischer, 2006: 21–22)
As Fischer argues, culture and ideology have a lot in common, because culture is often used as an
instrument of the state's internal and foreign policy, serving as a pretext for certain political actions
to gain internal or foreign support. On the other hand, culture may hinder the implementation of
certain political assumptions, forcing decision-makers to make political decisions motivated by
their own cultural and religious rhetoric, serving the stereotypes they have promoted . However,
in the collision of material and cultural interests, in most cases material interests prevail. The
exception may be the approach of radical groups referring to a specific ethnic or religious identity
(vide Islamic or Hindu fundamentalists), who undertake military actions to oppose globalization
and Westernization (Fischer, 2006: 22).
Religion and security issues
The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the dramatic disintegration of the bipolar system,
which resulted in bloody ethnoreligious conflicts in Chechnya, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh, and finally the bloody civil war in the former Yugoslavia, drew
researchers' attention to the problem of the importance of religion in international relations.
However, the event that drew public attention most strongly to the issue of religion and its potential
threats was the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Bosco, 2014: 1)
The secularization paradigm was not fully in tune with the social and political processes observed
globally during the Cold War. Local traditions based on religious traditions opposed communist
and capitalist concepts, rejecting the secular model of perceiving the world. As Jose Casanova
notes, “religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized
role which theories of modernity, as well as theories of secularization, had reserved for them”
(Casanova, 1994: 5–6). In addition, religious institutions and organizations increasingly establish
relationships between the private and public spheres, showing interest in the state and the
economy. As a result, we are dealing with the “repoliticization of the private religious and moral
spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for
lack of a better term, the "deprivatization" of religion" (Casanova, 1994: 5–6). In part, this process
is related to the crisis of modernism. As Gilles Kepel noted: "The crisis of the 1970s, by weakening
the social cohesion fostered by the welfare state, has brought hidden human miseries to light. To
their eyes, it reveals the emptiness of liberal and Marxist secular utopias, which have led to selfish
consumerism in the West, and, in the socialist countries and the Third World, to repression, poverty
and a dehumanized society" (Kepel, 1994: 4–5).
Criticism of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations paradigm, which linked religious revival
with increasing interreligious tensions, did not depreciate the significance of the phenomenon
itself. As Scott Appleby observes, from the point of view of international security, religion, or
perhaps a more politicized religion, may contribute to an increase in intolerance and violence, but
may also favour a peaceful resolution of conflict (Appleby, 2000: 1–25).
In a way, this phenomenon is a consequence of the tensions that arise within individual religions.
Between traditional religion, which most often promotes values compatible with liberalism, such
as tolerance, freedom, justice, and "pseudo-religion", which uses religion for political purposes.
For this reason, supporting the traditional model of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and promoting
the modernization of these religions in the spirit of openness and tolerance is an important element
of state security (Bosco, 2014: 5).
The key issue, of course, is when religion as such can be considered a security risk. Barry Buzan,
Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde write that security issues are subjective, because in practice issues
defined as security threats are not always real security threats. Raising a problem to the rank of a
threat allows the use of extraordinary measures, such as bending or breaking laws or the
introduction of extraordinary procedures that are not used in normal times (Buzan, Waever, &
Wilde, 1998: 24). Securitization should be treated not as identifying specific threats, but also
constructing them. Public discourse can give meaning to certain phenomena. For this reason, the
subject of protection can be tangible (body, species, army, building) or intangible (culture,
tradition, identity, a way of life, idea). The same applies to threats (Bosco, 2014: 15).
After the 9/11 attack, one of the key topics in public discourse was the threat posed by radical
Islamists. The terrorist attack reinforced the social anxiety generated by the public discourse.
Before the attack, the neoconservative communities in the United States avoided linking Islam
with security issues due to their dependence on oil supplies from the Middle East. The attack on
the heart of the "free world" forced the United States to launch the "war on terror". It also brought
about a reduction in civil rights and an increase in xenophobic moods (Kepel, 2003, 2004). Fear
of Islam affects European societies and to a lesser extent the people of the United States. It also
significantly shapes the immigration policy of the United States and European Union countries
(Bilgiç, 2013; Givens et al., 2009).
The politicization and securitization of a particular religion are not new phenomena. States, nongovernmental organizations, and religious communities have often used religion to build their own
identity (vide Chechnya, Central Asian states), or to mobilize society in the fight against enemies
(vide jihad, holy war). Religion can also be used as a tool to combat extremist groups by promoting
moderate communities and traditional Islam, as is done by the Russian Federation, the United
States, Britain, and other European countries. Religion can also be an important component of the
state's foreign policy, strengthening alliances and developing international cooperation (Bosco,
2014; Hunter, 2015).
Ethnic minorities, migration, and the issue of cultural security
According to the position of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, security is connected not
only with the survival of the state but also with the survival of specific social or group identities.
For this reason, the main security challenges are associated primarily with the competition of
specific identities. One element in constructing a specific identity is the speech acts of
securitization, which define the object of protection and the potential measures that can be taken.
If the actions are effective, then there is a shift from "normal politics" to "emergency politics". In
this narrative, societal security and identity are at the centre (Jutila, 2006: 168).
Security is therefore a specific type of interplay between human collectives that follow the logic
of security. In the case of state security, the collective is the state aimed at survival and sovereignty.
In the case of societal security, this function is performed by a society that focuses its attention on
identity. Within society, specific ideas and practices emerge that identify individuals as members
of a particular social group. The goal of a given social group is therefore to maintain their character
in a situation of changing conditions as well as potential and real challenges and threats. In the
case of the state, the political system determines who can speak for the state in the context of
security. In the case of society, practically anyone can express their concerns regarding security,
and often only after the fact do we see how much legitimacy an actor has to speak on behalf of
society (Wæver et al., 1993: 24–188).
The problem is of course identity itself, which is not something permanent, but in the opinion of
constructivists, it is constantly changing. There is a constant discourse created by political leaders,
intellectuals, the media, NGOs, religious leaders, and countless others. They participate in the
construction of a common identity and define potential or real threats. In the moment of
securitization of a given issue, we observe a clear separation between "friends and enemies".
Enemies pose an existential threat to the community, and therefore extraordinary measures are
required to sustain a competitive project, which may include the elimination of the enemy. Often,
taking these actions is associated with haste, as existential threats require urgent action. The danger
of death or other dramatic consequences justifies extraordinary measures that cannot always be
considered compatible with liberal democracy. (Jutila, 2006: 171–173).
The rivalry between different communities, constructed by identity, intensifies in situations of
political and social-economic crises, which create opportunities for changing the social situation
and shifting the position of individual communities. In this way, the narrative rivalry begins,
which, while forming individual communities, may constitute the basis for the functioning of the
state. The ease of securitization of minority rights is related to the popularity of an ideology that
was extremely attractive in the 20th century - nationalism. The release of post-communist states
from the "prison of nations" sparked the tendency to create ethnically or religiously homogeneous
states. The special dynamics of these processes in Europe took place after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the decomposition of Yugoslavia. (Fowkes, 2002: 1-16,100-167).
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was related to several problems due to the economic crisis,
which during the breakup, as in most post-communist countries, was manifested by a significant
increase in unemployment, inflation, a decline in GDP, and lower living standards. There was also
a collapse of the state ideology of "self-management socialism" and a collapse of the bipolar
system, which was the external factor that held the state together. The problem was the lack of
democratic traditions in the region and the lack of an idea to replace the existing integration
structures, which made the nationalist discourse, and the desire to separate from other ethnic or
religious groups through the guidelines of borders, which became a symbol of regained
sovereignty, grew in importance. An important goal was also to create a homogeneous state, which
was to ensure the safe development and prosperity of the ethnic groups living there (Wilmer,
2002: 5–54).
As Zlatko Isakovic notes, the political situation in the pre-collapse of Yugoslavia resembled the
19th-century European balance-of-power system. The disintegration processes fuelled the
aspirations for the secession of individual republics, which fuelled nationalist moods, creating their
own identity based on a mythologized vision of the past, exposing ethnic and cultural differences
contrasted with hostile identities. Mutual reluctance was reinforced by religious differences,
which, when used as objects, fuelled ethnic conflicts. To achieve their goals, not only was
propaganda used but also violence was used on a large scale. The spiral of hatred was intensified
not only by the securitized narrative but also by specific actions. Among them, we can list actions
aimed at limiting the possibility of expressing one's own ethnic or religious identity by limitation
of language rights and the wearing of traditional costumes, and closure of traditional educational
institutions and places of worship. Individual communities claimed rights to certain "ethnic lands",
the possession of which was justified by referring to the mythologized past, and in extreme cases
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or even genocide took place. (Isakovic, 2020: 2-12, 211-217).
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a specific example of a conflict in which artificially
fuelled ethnic and religious differences and extensive securitization of political and social
discourse influenced the course of the confrontation of rival identities, escalating to war crimes,
ethnic purges, or genocide. Ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet area, which were a consequence of
the collapse of the Soviet Union, had a similarly dramatic course. As in Yugoslavia, the crisis of
communist ideology combined with an unprecedented economic crisis and the disintegration of
state structures. In addition, some of the local nomenclatures decided that there was a convenient
opportunity to become independent from the federal centre and to acquire ownership over state
property. This process was accompanied by an anti-Russian narrative, which resulted in ethnic
tensions, and in some regions also religious tensions. This mainly applies to the Caucasus and
Central Asia. In some parts of the post-Soviet area, ethnic conflicts have developed into armed
conflicts linked to separatism (Fowkes, 2002; George, 2009)
The anti-Russian narrative resulted in massive migration of Russian-speaking people from the
former Soviet republics. On the other hand, the rise of nationalist sentiment in the Russian
Federation favoured the building of a narrative of the "besieged fortress" which is threatened by
internal and external enemies (Yablokov, 2018). At the same time ethnic conflicts played out in
the post-Soviet area to rebuild political influence. Simultaneously, in some post-Soviet republics,
fear of the unfavourable influence of the Russian-speaking minority was growing, especially in
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia. The two Baltic states not only decided to tighten the
anti-Russian narrative but also initiated ethnic policy based on segregation, depriving hundreds of
thousands of Russian-speaking people of citizenship. Which in turn was skilfully used by the
Russian Federation in its foreign policy (Smith, 1996: 201–206).
The problem of securitization of discourse related to migration processes has been noticed by a
growing number of researchers. This phenomenon became particularly strong after the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001. The use of migration by populists and the European far-right to
create an artificial threat from the point of view of the state, society, and the labour market, as well
as to mobilize society and gain popularity, is a serious political and social challenge that the
European Union is currently facing (Givens et al., 2009: 2–18). On the other hand, migration
processes are used by terrorist groups, the migration industry, and criminal organizations to
facilitate their transnational activities. Excessive publicity of marginal cases is conducive to
building false stereotypes as well as xenophobic and anti-immigrant moods (Alexseev, 2006: 332, 148-175).
Creating the image of a migrant as a potentially dangerous person, committing a significant
number of crimes, unfairly competing in the labour market, and not integrating with the host
society is an element of the specific politics of fear. The creation of fear of a stereotypical migrant
and exposing the state's effectiveness in controlling migration flows and counteracting criminal
activity accompanying migration processes are intended to create an image of the state's
effectiveness in controlling and managing migrations. These actions aim to polarize the host
society and migrants to achieve certain political benefits (Huysmans, 2006: 46–60).
Conclusions
Cultural security is one of the spheres of state security and societal security, which is extremely
difficult to precisely define. It is even more difficult to define specific challenges or threats to
cultural security. From the point of view of the constructivist theory, they are a consequence of a
specific discourse that defines threats concerning a specific ethnic, national, or religious identity,
along with the creation of the dichotomous relationship "friend” – “enemy". It is worth
emphasizing that we are not always dealing with real threats. Sometimes they are created for
political purposes and serve as a mobilizing factor for a given social, ethnic, or political group.
Thus, if a specific decision-making elite refers to cultural determinants in the decision-making
process, this may, but does not have to, imply specific material losses because political decisions
motivated in such a way are not always rational. On the other hand, sometimes the official state
discourse is built based on a narrative contrary to the official "national culture" in a situation where
the goal is to achieve certain political benefits.
Strengthening fears of Muslims, Jews, migrants, and representatives of ethnic, political, sexual,
and social minorities is not a new phenomenon. However, it is an extremely dangerous
phenomenon, as under certain conditions "hate speech" may turn into ethnic, ethno-religious or
religious conflicts, and in extreme cases in ethnic cleansing or genocide. For this reason, from the
point of view of societal security, a discourse consolidating xenophobic, anti-immigrant attitudes
or targeting specific political, social, religious, ethnic, or sexual minorities may constitute a real
threat.
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